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Abstract 
 
The incessant fiscal deficit being experienced in different countries across the world has raised 
concerns about the ability of government to properly manage its revenues and expenditures. This 
has necessitated a flurry of studies on the relationship between government revenues and 
government expenditures over time. However, empirical evidence appears to be mixed, even 
within a country, depending on the methodological approaches adopted by each researcher. In 
the light of this, this study examines the asymmetric causality and cointegration between 
revenues and expenditures using aggregated and disaggregated data. The results of linear 
causality tests of Granger (1969) and Toda-Yamamoto (1995) support fiscal synchronisation 
hypothesis while those of nonlinear causality test of Diks and Panchenko (2006) support 
revenue-spending hypothesis. The results further show the existence of asymmetric cointegration 
between revenues and expenditures in the short-run and the long-run. The final results obtained 
from the decomposition of revenues into the positive and negative components show that positive 
change in revenues has a positive effect on expenditures and vice versa for a negative change in 
revenues. Based on these findings, the panacea proposed to over-reliance in revenues, 
particularly oil revenues as a determinant of government expenditures, is the proper 
management of oil revenues and other sources of revenues. The government would also need to 
diversify the economy so that more revenues could be available to it from other sources to 
finance its expenditures. 
 
Keywords: Government Revenues, Government Expenditures, Asymmetries, Causality, 
Cointegration 
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 1 Introduction 
The equilibrium of government revenues and expenditures determines its fiscal discipline-a term 
known as fiscal balance or balanced budget. In practice, this is the goal that every government, 
both in developed and developing countries, has always been striving to achieve. However, the 
experience has shown that many countries run fiscal deficits - a difference between government 
revenues and government expenditures over time, particularly a fiscal year.1 Using the United 
States of America and Nigeria to represent developed and developing countries respectively, 
available statistics as depicted in Figure 1 show that the US has been recording fiscal deficits 
since 2002, which became worsened during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Similarly, Nigeria has 
also been recording fiscal deficits since inception of the current democratic government, which 
began in 1999. Specifically, average fiscal deficits in the US and Nigeria between 1999 and 2016 
stood at $495.82 and $3.37 million dollar, respectively.  
 
   
Source: Computed by the Authors from fiscal deficit data obtained from US Federal Reserve 
of St Louis and Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin, various years 
 
 Although overshooting of government expenditures over government revenues is the 
forerunner of fiscal or budget imbalance or deficit, the consequences thereof vary across 
countries. However, one immediate effect of fiscal deficits is the rising debt profile of a country 
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 However, fiscal deficit is more pronounced in developing countries than developed countries.  
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Figure 1: Fiscal deficits in US and Nigeria (1999-2016)
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facing a chronic fiscal imbalance.2 This is usually followed by the overwhelming social-
economic crises such as rising inflation, slow growth, trade deficit, rising unemployment, 
crowding out of private investment and lots more (Bernheim, 1989; Ball and Mankiw, 1995; 
Stiglitz and Walsh, 2008, Nimani,2013; Tešić, Ilić and Đelić, 2014). The consequences of fiscal 
deficits, however, depend on the sources of fiscal deficit. If fiscal imbalance arises from 
expending of government expenditure on critical infrastructural facilities that are very germane 
to the current and future benefits of the economy; such infrastructural facilities can generate 
enough revenue that will repay the fiscal deficit in the future. This may not portend a danger to 
the economy in the long-run. However, if the fiscal deficit arises from a sudden fall in the prices 
of exporting commodities of a country or falling tax revenue or exuberant government spending 
aimed at securing political gains can spell a doom for a country.3 
  Due to the consequences of fiscal deficit accumulation, economists and policymakers 
have been interested in studying the dynamics of the relationship between government revenues 
and expenditures in developed, emerging and developing countries for a very long time. Four 
hypotheses have served as a compass guiding the direction of research activity in this area. The 
first hypothesis is known as a revenue-spending hypothesis (tax-spending hypothesis), 
propounded independently by Buchanan and Wagner (1977) and Friedman (1978). The 
hypothesis simply implies that getting more revenues by raising taxes will only induce 
government to increase its spending. Thus, increases in taxes that spur government revenues will 
eventual result in fiscal deficit.  Empirically, this implies a unidirectional nexus running from 
government revenues to government expenditures. The second hypothesis is called spending-
revenue hypothesis and it was postulated by Barro (1974) and Wiseman and Peacock, (1979). 
The hypothesis stipulates that government expenditures determine or cause government 
revenues. The underlying intuition behind this hypothesis is that, in times of economic downturn 
or crisis, government usually gears up its expenditure which may ultimately lead to permanent 
increase in tax revenue. In this context, the unidirectional causality exists between government 
revenues and expenditures with the direction of causality running from government expenditures 
to government revenues. The third hypothesis was proposed by Musgrave (1961) and Meltzer 
and Richard (1981) and it is called fiscal synchronisation hypothesis. The hypothesis states that 
both government revenues and expenditures are jointly determined. In other words, the 
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 Many countries in Europe during and after the global financial crisis experienced rising debt of great magnitude. 
Some of these countries include Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and the host of others      
3
 In 2014, the price of main exporting commodity of Nigeria, the crude oil price, fell in international market; this 
created an economic crisis for the country as the economy experienced a recession for the first time in 25 years. 
government takes decisions on revenues and expenditures simultaneously. In this case, fiscal 
synchronization implies that there is a bidirectional causality between government revenues and 
expenditures. The last hypothesis is the fiscal neutrality promoted by Baghestani and McNown, 
(1994). The fiscal neutrality states that there is no causal relation between government 
expenditures and revenues because institutions separate decisions on revenues and expenditures. 
In other words, the decisions on revenues are taken by the institution independent of government 
spending decision.  
 Along these theoretical propositions, several empirical studies have been conducted 
across countries in the world, applying different econometric techniques to examine the 
relationship between government revenues and expenditures (Payne, 2003 for an extensive 
review of the literature). From these studies, several natures of relationships between government 
revenues and expenditures have been examined. This ranges from linear to nonlinear causality or 
nexus between the two variables. With regard to linear relationship, most prominent issues 
addressed in the literature are the issues of causality and cointegration, using econometric 
techniques such as Granger causality, Toda-Yamamoto causality, panel causality, vector error 
correction model (VECM) based causality, Johansen system cointegration, Engle-Granger 
cointegration, error correction model (ECM), autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds 
testing and vector autoregressive method (VAR) and lots more. In the case of nonlinear 
modelling of revenue-expenditure nexus, researchers have used different nonlinear methods such 
as threshold autoregressive (TAR), Momentum TAR, threshold autoregressive error correction 
method and lots more. The use of different econometric techniques and other factors such as 
each country’s economic characteristics such as size of the government, dynamics of economic 
environment, institutional structure, custom or culture among others, have been the driver of 
flurries of mixed empirical findings (see details in the table of literature review in the appendix). 
 The current study focuses on the Nigerian economy. As in the case of other countries, 
several empirical studies have been conducted to examine the relationship between government 
revenue and expenditure in Nigeria, albeit, with mixed findings (Ogujiuba and Abraham, 2012; 
Aregbeyen and Ibrahim, 2012a, 2012b; Aworinde, 2013; Nwosu and Okafor, 2014; Ibrahim, 
2017; Abdulrasheed, 2017; Yinusa and Adedokun, 2017). Apart from the mixed findings, most 
of the studies conducted so far assume linear nexus between revenues and expenditures, applying 
different econometric techniques. Specifically, Aregbeyen and Ibrahim (2012a) used ARDL 
method to examine the relationship between government expenditure and revenue and found 
support for revenue-spending hypothesis. Aregbeyen and Ibrahim, (2012b), however, employed 
Granger-causality test to document a fiscal synchronisation hypothesis. Fiscal synchronisation 
hypothesis was also reported by the study carried out by Ibrahim, (2017) using the causality 
approach with structural break. Applying ECM, Nwosu and Okafor (2014) established the 
existence of the spending-revenue hypothesis. The same spending-revenue hypothesis was 
documented by Abdulrasheed (2017) while Yinusa and Adedokun (2017), in line with 
Arugbeyen and Ibrahim (2012) also found support for revenue-spending hypothesis. The only 
study akin to our study is the study conducted by Aworinde, (2013), albeit his study is limited to 
testing the nonlinear causality between government revenues and expenditures only at the 
aggregate level.  In our case, we do not only examine nonlinear causality but also consider the 
case of asymmetric cointegration between government revenues and expenditures at both 
aggregate and disaggregate levels.  
 As aforementioned, this study aims at examining the case of asymmetric causality and 
cointegration between government revenues and expenditures in Nigeria. In the economic 
parlance, it is believed that macroeconomic variables usually behave nonlinearly over the course 
of the economic cycle (Neftci. 1984). Based on this, Ewing et al. (2006) provides possible 
explanations for the existence of asymmetric relationship between government revenues and 
expenditures. Aside this, the movement of oil prices in the international market determines the 
behaviour of government revenues and expenditures in Nigeria.  In Nigeria, the large part of 
revenues accrued to the government come from the sales of crude oil whose prices are subject to 
demand for and supply of crude oil in the international market. As the oil prices fluctuate (ups 
and downs), so also is the revenue realised from the sales of crude oil as well as the government 
expenditure (see Raifu and Raheem, 2018). Thus, it is expedient to re-examine the revenue-
expenditure nexus nonlinearly or asymmetrically.  
 
 The study adds to the existing studies in the following ways. First, it considers the case of 
nonlinear causality and cointegration between government revenues and expenditures. In the 
case of causality, for thorough robustness, the study combines both linear and nonlinear causality 
tests using different estimation methods such as the usual Granger-causality test (Granger, 1969), 
Toda-Yamamoto non-causality (Toda and Yamamoto, 1995) and nonlinear causality test 
proposed by Diks and Panchenko in 2006. Although Diks and Pachenko, (2006) has been applied 
by Aworinde (2013) to model nonlinear causality between revenues and expenditures in Nigeria, 
albeit at aggregate level without taking into consideration the disaggregated data such capital 
expenditure, recurrent expenditure, oil revenue and nonoil revenue. Concerning the nonlinear 
cointegration, this study makes use of nonlinear cointegration method based on Shin, Yu and 
Greenwood-Nimmo (2014) nonlinear ARDL. This method has advantages over other 
cointegration methods previously used in the literature because apart from the fact that it is 
capable of performing asymmetric cointegration, it also captures asymmetric short-run and long-
run impacts of revenue on expenditure and vice versa. Thus, the method helps in shedding light 
on whether any of the hypotheses hold in the short-run and the long-run asymmetrically. Our 
study is the first study that will employ NARDL to model the dynamic relationship between 
revenues and expenditures. Other studies have used TAR and MTAR (Zapf and Paynes, 2009; 
Saunoris and Payne, 2010; Tiwari and Mutascu, 2016; Phiri, 2016). Second, in this study, we 
also make use of both aggregated and disaggregated data on revenues and expenditures.4 This is 
to prove the consistence of the results and to provide robustness for this study.  
 The rest of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data used and the 
methodology. Section 3 presents the empirical findings. Section 4 concludes with policy 
recommendations.5    
 
2 Materials and Methodology 
2.1 Materials 
This study uses annual data from 1970 to 2011. The source of the data is the Central Bank of 
Nigeria. The main variables extracted include total government revenue, oil revenue, non-oil 
revenue, total government expenditure, recurrent expenditure, capital expenditure, consumer 
price index and real Gross Domestic Product. These variables (total government revenue, oil 
revenue, nonoil revenue, total government expenditure, recurrent expenditure and capital 
expenditure) are scaled by gross domestic product, measured in real term and in million naira. 
The descriptive statistics of these variables are presented in Table 1. Following the summary 
statistics is the Figure 2 that shows the trend of the government revenues and expenditures scaled 
by GDP over times. From the figure, it can be observed that both government revenues and 
expenditures co-move. In other words, when revenues increase, government expenditures tend to 
soar and vice versa.   
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Results 
Variable TRREV TROEXP ROILREV RNONOILREV RRECEXP RCAPEXP RGDP ROSURPDEF 
 Mean 16156.69 10281.34 12590.37 3558.96 5916.10 4285.96 281644.80 -1997.64 
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 Disaggregated data of revenues include oil and nonoil revenues while that of the expenditure include recurrent 
and capital expenditure.  
5
 The literature review is summarised in the Table put in appendix to this study.   
 Median 12579.14 10136.98 9570.59 2895.03 5284.10 3881.42 266464.60 -2141.28 
 Maximum 40844.19 17521.17 33907.74 7968.84 13828.82 11549.20 834161.80 5794.84 
 Minimum 2756.52 3930.00 724.35 1404.66 2414.83 754.78 4219.00 -6412.82 
 Std. Dev. 10482.87 3825.36 9232.74 1674.69 2707.44 2178.03 228538.70 2231.32 
 Skewness 1.02 0.26 1.11 1.16 0.92 1.02 0.73 0.83 
 Kurtosis 2.92 2.03 3.23 3.54 3.40 4.37 2.78 5.00 
 Jarque-Bera 7.27 2.09 8.78 10.00 6.26 10.54 3.80 11.85 
 Probability 0.03 0.35 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.15 0.00 
Observations 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
Source: Authors’ computation.  
Note: TRREV, TROEXP, ROILREV, RNONOILREV, RRECEXP, RCAPEXP, RGDP and 
ROSURPDEF denote real total revenue, real total expenditure, real oil revenue, real nonoil 
revenue, real recurrent expenditure, real capital expenditure, real GDP and real overall fiscal 
surplus/deficit respectively. All variables are measured in Million Naira.  
 
Figure 2: Trends of government revenues and expenditures from 1970-2011 
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2.2 Methodologies  
2.2.1 Linear Granger Causality Test Framework 
This study aims at examining nonlinear causality and contegration between government revenues 
and expenditures in Nigeria. To begin with, there is need to ascertain the stationarity properties 
of the variables by using appropriate unit root test methods. Thus, this study uses Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron unit root tests. The basic requirement for estimating causality 
and cointegration is that the variables must be stationary, particularly integrated of order 1, 
however, the method we employ in this study allows for cointegration of any order except order 
2. Assume that the variables are stationary, say tR  and tE ,6 following Granger (1969), tR strictly 
Granger causes tE if and only if the past values tR  have significant power to predict, in linear 
form, the current values of tE , from the past values of tE .  According to Diks and Panchenko, 
(2006) and Bekiros and Diks, (2008), if the past values 
sR  and sE  s t , contain the 
information sets denoted by 
,R tF and E,tF and that the equivalent in distribution is denoted as , 
then that tR will Granger-cause tE if, 1k   can be specified as: 
1( ,..., )t t kE E  ׀ , E,( , )R t tF F 1( ,..., )t t kE E  ,E tF      (1) 
Specifically, the estimable Granger causality test in the content of VAR framework can be re-
specified as: 
  
1 1
n n
t i t i j t j t
i j
R R E   
 
          (2) 
  
1 1
n n
t j t j i t i t
j i
E E R u  
 
          (3) 
In modern econometric software, the null hypothesis of Granger non-causality is either accepted 
or rejected based on the probability value or T-value or standard error. Using the probability 
value, if the probability value is less than 5%, the assumption of Granger non-causality is 
rejected, otherwise it is accepted. For robustness, this study complements the Granger causality 
method by using another causality test known as Toda-Yamamoto non causality test in the spirit 
of Toda and Yamamoto (1995). For advantages of Toda-Yamamoto approach to causality over 
Granger-causality, interested readers should see Toda and Yamamoto (1995, pp. 226 and 227). 
 
  
2.2.2 Nonlinear Granger Causality Test Framework 
In the case of nonlinear causality, we follow Diks and Panchenko (2006) framework religiously. 
The method is a nonparametric approach to causality. Suppose we are interested in testing the 
causality between sR  and sE  using appropriate p  and q lags of the two variables. Consider the 
vectors of sR  and sE  given respectively as: 
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 Here R stands for revenues while E denotes expenditures except otherwise stated. 
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( ,..., )
( ,..., E )
p
t t p t
q
t t q t
R R R
E E
 
 

        (4) 
Where , 1p q  . The null hypothesis here is that ptR does not Granger-cause qtE . In other words, 
the null hypothesis implies that ptR does not contain additional information about the future 
value of expenditure denoted as 1tE  . This null hypothesis is specified as: 
1:o tH E  ׀ 1( ; )p qt t tR E E  ׀ qtE       (5) 
According to Bekiros and Diks (2008), the null hypothesis is a statement about the invariant of 
the vector of random variables ( , , )p qt t t tW R E Z where 1t tZ E  . If the time indexes are dropped 
and assume that 1p q  , the joint probability density function of 
,E,Z (r,e, z)Rf and its marginals 
must satisfy the following relation: 
, , ,E E,Z(r,e, z) ( , ) (e, z)
(e) ( ) ( )
R E Z R
E E E
f f r e f
f f e f e       (6) 
The equation 6 implies that R and Z are independent conditionally on E e  for each fixed value 
of e . Based on this, the null hypothesis can be re-specified as: 
 
, , , ,
( ( , , ) ( ) ( , ) f (E, Z)R E Z E R E E Zq E f R E Z f E f R E      (7) 
According to Diks and Panchenko (2006), q  can be estimated using the equation 8 below. 
 
^ ^ ^ ^
, , , ,
(n 1)( ) ( ( , ,E ) (E ) ( , ) ( , )( 2)n n i i i Y i i i i iR Z E R E E Zi
T f R Z f f R E f E Z
n n
     (8) 
Where n is the sample size and 
^
Wf is a local density estimator of a Wd - variate random vector W
at iW based on indicator functions ( )Wij i j nI I W W     defined by 
  
^
.
(2 )(W )
1
Wd
Wn
i ijW
j j i
f I
n
 

         (9) 
Where  .I is the indicator function and n is the bandwidth that depends on n , the sample size.  
If 1p q  and 1 1(C 0, )
4 3n
C      , then the test statistics in equation satisfies  
( ) ) (0,1)Dn n
n
T q
n N
S
  
      (10) 
According to Diks and Panchenko (2006) Dis the convergence in distribution and nS
represents an estimator of the asymptotic variance of  .nT . Practically, the theoretical 
framework above is applied to the joint residuals of the variables in the estimated VAR model. It 
is believed that application of Granger causality method to the VAR residuals should be 
nonlinear as the linear relationship is contained in the estimated coefficients of VAR (Rocher, 
2017).  
2.2.3 Nonlinear Autoregressive Distributed Lag Framework 
This study employs bounds testing approach to cointegration in NARDL framework. The 
NARDL framework was developed by Shin, Yu and Greenwood-Nimmo in 2014 to capture the 
asymmetric relationship between dependent variable and independent variable(s). The 
framework begins by first specifying the long-run model given as:7 
0 1 2(R ) (R )t t t tE               (11) 
Where 1  and 2 are the coefficients of the long-run model to be estimated. iR and iR are the 
partial sum of positive and negative change of government revenues. The partial decomposition 
of government revenues into positive and negative changes can be derived as: 
1 1
1 1
max( ,0)
min( ,0)
t t
t j j
j j
t t
t j j
j j
R R R
R R R
 
 
 
 
   
   
 
 
      (12) 
The NARDL model can then be specified as follows: 
 
0 1 1 2 1 3 1 1 1 1
1 0
( )
p q
t t t t t t t t t t t
i i
E E R R E R R                   
 
               (13) 
Where p and q are the lag orders, 0 1 2, ,    and 3  are the long-run coefficient parameters to be 
estimated, 
0
q
t
i
 

  and 
0
q
t
i
 

 are the short-run asymmetric distributed lag coefficients. The long-
run positive and negative effects of government revenues on government expenditures are 
denoted as: 22
1
 

  and 33
1
 

  respectively. The null hypothesis of no long-run effects of 
positive and negative of government revenues on expenditures  is tested by the equality relation 
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 The model specification rests on the assumption that there is unidirectional causality between government 
revenues and government expenditures with the direction of causality running from government revenues to 
government expenditures. However, this is subject to change based on the outcome of Granger causality results, 
particularly nonlinear Granger causality on the results. 
given as: 32
1 1

 

 against the alternative hypothesis given as: 32
1 1

 

 . If the null hypothesis 
is rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis, it implies that there is asymmetric long-run 
relationship between government revenues and expenditures. In same vein, the null hypothesis 
stipulating no short-run asymmetric effects of government revenues on  expenditure can be 
specified as i i    against alternative hypothesis given as: i i    . If the null 
hypothesis is rejected in favour of alternative hypothesis, it means that the short-run relation 
exists between government revenues and expenditures. To confirm both short-run and long-run, 
Wald test is used after estimation of NARDL. Post estimation tests such as normality test, ARCH 
LM heteroscedasticity test, serial autocorrelation test and Ramsey Reset test for the appropriate 
model specification are carried out. CUSUM and CUSUM squared for model stability are also 
performed.   
3 Empirical Findings 
This section presents the estimated results. We begin by conducting preliminary unit root tests 
with the goal to ascertain the stationarity properties of the variables used in this study. This is 
done so that spurious regression can be avoided. Apart from this, conducting cointegration test 
requires that the unit root must first be performed on the variables and they must be stationary at 
order one. Two unit root tests were performed and they include Augmented Dickey Fuller and 
Phillips-Perron unit root tests (Dickey and Fuller, 1981; Phillips and Perron, 1988). Both unit 
root tests have the same null hypothesis. They are only different in terms of statistical tests. 
While ADF uses the tau statistic test, PP uses the Z-statistic test. The null hypothesis is that the 
data series have unit roots against which the alternative hypothesis which states that the data 
series are stationary is tested. The results of the unit root tests are presented in Table 2. The 
results show that the variables of interest, revenues and expenditures, contain unit roots. This 
implies that the variables are not stationary. They are only made stationary after they are first 
differenced. Therefore, the cointegration test can be performed. However, the nonlinear 
cointegration we conducted based on bounds testing NARDL approach to cointegration permits 
the series to be integrated of any order, either order one or order two, and not necessarily order 
one. 
Table 2: Results of Unit Root Tests  
Variable Augmented Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron Decision 
 Level First Difference Level First Difference  
TRREV_GDP -1.60 (0.4758) -6.17*** (0.0000) -1.45 (0.5494) -6.24*** (0.0000) I(1) 
TROEXP_GDP -2.35  (0.1616) -6.95*** (0.0000) -3.95*** (0.0039) -7.19*** (0.0000) I(1) 
ROILREV_GDP -1.76 (0.3956) -6.75*** (0.0000) -1.82 (0.3656) -7.82*** (0.0000) I(1) 
RNONOILREV_GDP -2.87** (0.0577) -4.96*** (0.0002) -6.91*** (0.0000) -5.28*** (0.0001) I(0) 
RRECEXP_GDP -11.93 (0.0000)*** -2.98** (0.0461) -8.61*** (0.0000) -4.47*** (0.0009) I(0) 
RCAPEXP_GDP -1.39 (0.5774) -9.22 ***(0.0000) -1.86 (0.3477) -9.89*** (0.0000) I(1) 
Source: Authors’  Computation 
***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
The values in parentheses are probability values  
 
3.1 Linear Causality Tests Results  
The next test conducted is the causality test. The first causality test performed is the Granger 
causality test in the spirit of Granger (1969). The test is predicated on the assumption that there is 
no causality between the series. This is tested against the alternative assumption that there is 
causality between the series. Based on Akaike Information Criterion, 7 maximum lag lengths 
were used. The results show that there exists a bidirectional relationship between government 
expenditures and revenues both at aggregate and disaggregate levels. In other words, government 
expenditures and revenues tend to strengthen each other through bidirectional feedback (Roy, 
Sahoo and Kamaiah, 2000). This finding supports the fiscal synchronisation hypothesis. To test 
the robustness of these results, we employed Toda-Yamamoto (1995), the results are ditto as in 
the case of Granger-causality test. Thus, supporting the previous studies that found the existence 
of fiscal synchronisation in Nigeria and other countries (Ibrahim, 2017 Nigeria; Takumah, 2014 
Ghana; Mehrara, Pahlavani and Elyasi, 2011 41 Asian countries; Chang and Chiang, 2009 15 
OECD countries; Al-Zeaud, 2014 Jordan; Gounder, Narayan and Prasad, 2007 Fiji at aggregate 
level; Li, 2001 China; Phiri, 2016 South Africa; Owoye, 1995 G7 countries except for Japan and 
Italy). This implies that the decision to raise revenues and spending of the revenues are taken 
simultaneously. In other words, it implies that in Nigeria, when government designs spending 
programs either to pay workers’ salaries or invest in infrastructural facilities such as roads, 
hospitals, schools and so on, it also simultaneously designs or chooses the revenues packages to 
finance the spending programs.  
Table 3: Linear Causality: Granger Causality Test Results 
Null Hypothesis Granger-Causality Toda-Yamamoto 
TROEXP_GDP does not Granger Cause TRREV_GDP 32.50*** (0.0000) 229.40*** (0.0000) 
TRREV_GDP does not Granger Cause TROEXP_GDP 50.77*** (0.0000) 46.27*** (0.0000) 
RRECEXP_GDP does not Granger Cause TRREV_GDP 46.35*** (0.0000) 64.46*** (0.0000) 
TRREV_GDP does not Granger Cause RRECEXP_GDP 19.56*** (0.0000) 28.22*** (0.0002) 
RCAPEXP_GDP does not Granger Cause TRREV_GDP 27.93*** (0.0000) 233.08***  (0.0000) 
TRREV_GDP does not Granger Cause RCAPEXP_GDP 37.75*** (0.0000) 299.57*** (0.0000) 
TROEXP_GDP does not Granger Cause ROILREV_GDP 46.69*** (0.0000) 321.88*** (0.0000) 
ROILREV_GDP does not Granger Cause TROEXP_GDP 94.65*** (0.0000) 23.41*** (0.0000) 
RRECEXP_GDP does not Granger Cause ROILREV_GDP 52.62*** (0.0000) 104.65***  ( 0.0000) 
ROILREV_GDP does not Granger Cause RRECEXP_GDP 26.23*** (0.0000) 56.15*** (0.0000) 
RCAPEXP_GDP does not Granger Cause ROILREV_GDP 30.55*** (0.0000) 100.99*** (0.0000) 
ROILREV_GDP does not Granger Cause RCAPEXP_GDP 117.46*** (0.0000) 267.21*** (0.0000) 
TROEXP_GDP does not Granger Cause RNONOILREV_GDP 15.49*** (0.0000)  82.47*** (0.0000) 
RNONOILREV_GDP does not Granger Cause TROEXP_GDP 105.79*** (0.0000) 525.13*** (0.0000) 
RRECEXP_GDP does not Granger Cause RNONOILREV_GDP 7.42*** (0.0002) 56.40*** (0.0000) 
RNONOILREV_GDP does not Granger Cause RRECEXP_GDP 19.31*** (0.0000) 94.91*** (0.0000) 
RCAPEXP_GDP does not Granger Cause RNONOILREV_GDP 15.74***  (0.0000) 84.62*** (0.0000) 
RNONOILREV_GDP does not Granger Cause RCAPEXP_GDP 177.55*** (0.0000) 395.83***  (0.0000) 
Source: Authors’ Computation 
***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively 
The values in parentheses are probability values 
 
3.2 Nonlinear Causality Results 
The results of nonlinear causality between revenues and expenditures at aggregated and 
disaggregated levels are presented in Table 4. The nonlinear is carried out on the residuals of the 
VAR model in the spirit of Diks and Panchenko (2006). Using Akaike Information Criterion, 7 
maximum lags were selected. The results show in all the versions of the models we considered, 
there is only nonlinear unidirectional relationship between government revenues and 
expenditures with the direction of causality running from government revenues to expenditures. 
For instance, in the model of total government revenues and expenditures, the causality runs 
from total revenues to total expenditures, implying that government revenues nonlinearly 
Granger-causes expenditures. There is an absence of nonlinear causality between total 
government revenues and recurrent expenditures. However, there is a weak nonlinear 
bidirectional causality between government revenues and capital expenditures. The causality 
between capital expenditures and total government revenues is only significant at 10% level of 
significance while that between total government revenues and capital expenditures is significant 
at 1% level.  
 
 We also considered whether there is a nonlinear causality between oil revenues and total 
expenditures on the one hand and oil revenues and components of total expenditures (capital and 
recurrent expenditures) on the other hand. The results show that nonlinear unidirectional 
causality exists between oil revenues and total expenditures with the direction of causality 
running from oil revenues to total expenditures. As in the case of total revenues and recurrent 
expenditure, there is no nonlinear causality between oil revenues and recurrent expenditure. 
However, only nonlinear unidirectional causality exists between oil revenues and capital 
expenditures, with the direction of causality running from oil revenues to capital expenditure. 
With regard to nonlinear causality between nonoil revenues and total government expenditure 
and its components, there is unidirectional causality with the direction of causality running from 
nonoil revenues and total expenditures and its components. Thus, it can be submitted that when 
nonlinear causality is considered between government revenues and expenditures and their 
components, only revenue-spending hypothesis is valid. This finding corroborates the finding 
documented by Aworinde (2013) who examined the nonlinear causality between government 
revenues and expenditures on aggregated data in Nigeria. In fact, considering the nonlinear 
causality between revenues and expenditures reveals the reality of the Nigerian economy. As 
previously mentioned, government relies on the revenues to finance its expenditure. Since most 
of the revenues come from oil revenues realised from the sales of crude oil in the international 
market, whenever there is a shortage of revenues usually caused by falling oil prices, government 
expenditures also suffer. 
Table 4: Nonlinear Causality Results 
Null Hypothesis Causality 
TROEXP_GDP does not Granger Cause TRREV_GDP 0.74 (0.6434) 
TRREV_GDP does not Granger Cause TROEXP_GDP 4.36** (0.0108) 
RRECEXP_GDP does not Granger Cause TRREV_GDP 1.56 (0.2376) 
TRREV_GDP does not Granger Cause RRECEXP_GDP 1.59 (0.2283) 
RCAPEXP_GDP does not Granger Cause TRREV_GDP 2.52* (0.0669) 
TRREV_GDP does not Granger Cause RCAPEXP_GDP 7.90*** (0.0006) 
TROEXP_GDP does not Granger Cause ROILREV_GDP 0.24 (0.9684) 
ROILREV_GDP does not Granger Cause TROEXP_GDP 5.05*** (0.0059) 
RRECEXP_GDP does not Granger Cause ROILREV_GDP 0.63 (0.7263) 
ROILREV_GDP does not Granger Cause RRECEXP_GDP 0.67 (0.6954) 
RCAPEXP_GDP does not Granger Cause ROILREV_GDP 2.11 (0.1225) 
ROILREV_GDP does not Granger Cause RCAPEXP_GDP 3.79** (0.0210) 
TROEXP_GDP does not Granger Cause RNONOILREV_GDP 1.09 (0.4208) 
RNONOILREV_GDP does not Granger Cause TROEXP_GDP 3.43** (0.0264) 
RRECEXP_GDP does not Granger Cause RNONOILREV_GDP 1.54 (0.2388) 
RNONOILREV_GDP does not Granger Cause RRECEXP_GDP 6.00** (0.0028) 
RCAPEXP_GDP does not Granger Cause RNONOILREV_GDP 0.57 (0.7678) 
RNONOILREV_GDP does not Granger Cause RCAPEXP_GDP 3.72** (0.0198) 
 Source: Authors’ Computation 
***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively 
The values in parentheses are probability values 
 
3.3. Nonlinear Cointegration Results     
Having determined the stationarity properties of our variables and the issues of causality between 
them, we performed nonlinear cointegration test using a bounds testing approach to cointegration 
in NARDL framework developed by Shin, Yu and Greenwood-Nimmo, (2014). However, we 
base our cointegration test on the results obtained from the nonlinear causality test conducted 
above. Since in most of the nonlinear causality tests, we only documented revenue-spending 
hypothesis, the cointegration test, therefore, focuses on examining whether there is nonlinear 
long-run relationship between government revenues and expenditures (and their components). 
Using bounds testing approach to cointegration, Pesaran et al. (2001) provide criteria for 
determining whether the variables are cointegrated or not. The basic assumption based on this 
cointegration technique is that there is no long-run relationship between government revenues 
and expenditures against which the alternative hypothesis is tested postulating the existence of 
long-run relationship between the two variables. To make a decision, the computed F-statistic is 
compared with the lower bound and upper bound critical values provided in Pesaran et al.’s 
table. If the computed F-statistic value is less than the lower bound critical value, it means that 
there is no cointegration, that is, there is no long-run relationship between government revenues 
and expenditures. If it falls within the lower and upper bounds critical values, no precise decision 
can be made. However, if the computed F-statistic value falls above the upper bound critical 
value, then there is long-run relationship between government revenues and expenditures. The 
results of the cointegration test are presented in Table 5. In all the models we considered, it is 
evidence that there is long-run relation between the government revenues and expenditures 
because the calculated F-statistic values are greater than the upper bound critical values.    
 The next step after ascertaining the existence of the cointegration between government 
revenues and expenditures is to estimate the error correction model. The error correction model 
integrates the short-run dynamics into the long-run equilibrium to show how quickly the 
disequilibrium in the economy in the short-run adjusts towards the long-run equilibrium. A 
priori, the coefficient of the error correction term must be less than one, negatively signed and 
statistically significant. The results of error correction model are also presented in Table 5. The 
results corroborate the findings from the cointegration test. The coefficients of error correction 
terms in all the models are correctly signed and also statistically significant, albeit with varying 
degrees of convergence from the short-run towards the long-run equilibrium. However, as it is 
shown in the table by the values of the coefficients of the error terms in all models, the speed of 
adjustment from the short-run to the long-run is fast and take less than one and half years to 
restore the equilibrium. Several studies have also found the existence of cointegrating 
relationship between government revenues and expenditures (see Narayan, 2005; Mehrara, 
Pahlavani and Elyasi, 2011; Takumah, 2 014; Tiwari and Mutascu, 2016; Phiri, 2016; 
Baharumshah, Jibrilla, Sirag, Ali and Muhammad, 2016).    
 Having established that government revenues and expenditures are cointegrated and there 
is a possibility of adjusting towards the long-run equilibrium when there is disequilibrium in the 
economy, attention is herewith drawn to testing of the existence of asymmetries between 
government revenues and expenditures in the short-run and the long-run. This is done using a 
Wald test method after the estimation of NARDL. The results are also reported in Table 5. In all 
the models, the results show that there is short-run and long-run asymmetric relationship between 
government revenues and expenditures. The findings confirm the nonlinear Granger-causality 
test results documented above. Therefore, based on these findings, it can be submitted that the 
relationship between government revenues and expenditures is not linear in Nigeria, either at 
aggregate or disaggregate level. Our finding is supported by the finding documented by 
Irandoust, (2018) who found the asymmetric relationship between government expenditures and 
revenues and vice versa using a hidden cointegration technique proposed by Granger and Yoon, 
(2002). However, our results differ from the one documented by Zapf and Paynes, (2009) who 
did not find the asymmetric relationship between government revenues and spending using TAR 
and MTAR methods. 
     At this juncture, the results of impacts of positive and negative government revenues on 
government expenditures are considered in the short-run and the long-run. This is presented in 
Table 5. Beginning with total revenue and total expenditure model, it can be inferred that 
positive (an increase in) government revenue spurs its expenditure in the short-run and the long-
run. However, the positive effect declines over time. Specifically, an increase in revenue by 1% 
will result in an increase in government expenditure by 3.12% and 0.43% in the short-run and the 
long-run respectively. As expected, negative government revenue reduces expenditure in both 
runs; however, the impact is greater in the long-run than the short-run. Precisely, if revenue 
accrued to government reduces by 1%, its expenditure will decline in the short-run and the long-
run by 0.50% and 0.68% respectively. Because we did not find asymmetric Granger causality 
between total revenue and recurrent expenditure, we only considered the asymmetric relationship 
between total revenue and capital expenditure. The results, as presented in Table 5, show that an 
increase in revenue only has a positive effect on the capital expenditure in the short-run. In the 
long-run any increase in revenue to the government leads to a reduction in capital expenditure, 
albeit insignificant. However, in the short-run and the long-run, a reduction in revenue by 1% 
reduces its expenditure by 0.31% and 0.25% respectively.  
 With regard to the asymmetric effect of oil revenue on government expenditure and its 
components, particularly capital expenditure, the results show, as in the case of total revenue, 
that oil revenue also has a positive and significant effect on the government expenditure in the 
short-run and the long-run, with the impact being greater in the long-run. Precisely, government 
expenditure will rise by 2.11% and 0.87% in the short-run and the long-run respectively, if oil 
revenue realised by government surges up by 1%. On the other hand, a reduction in oil revenue 
also has a devastating effect on the government expenditure. As shown in the table, when the oil 
revenue contracts by 1%, government expenditure also contracts by 0.68% and 1.14% in the 
short-run and the long-run respectively. Similarly, positive and negative changes in oil revenue 
have opposite effect on capital expenditure. While positive change in oil revenue increases 
government expenditure, negative revenue reduces capital expenditure in both runs. Thus, an 
increase in oil revenue by 1%, capital expenditure will lead to increase in capital expenditure by 
0.35% and 0.51% in the short-run and the long-run respectively. Conversely, when oil revenue 
reduces by 1%, there will be a reduction in capital expenditure by 0.57% and 0.83% in the short-
run and the long-run respectively. 
 Concerning the nonoil revenue, we found the nonlinear unidirectional causality, running 
from nonoil revenue to expenditures (total expenditure, recurrent expenditure and capital 
expenditure). Therefore, we considered the asymmetric effects of nonoil revenue on all 
expenditures. As in the case of total revenue and oil revenue, positive change in nonoil revenue 
has a positive effect on the total expenditure, albeit only in the long-run. As shown in the table, 
an increase in nonoil revenue by 1% will result in an increase in total expenditure by 3.67% in 
the long-run. A negative change in nonoil revenue by 1% connotes a reduction in total 
expenditure by 5.19% and 4.06% in the short-run and the long-run respectively. When the case 
of asymmetric effect of nonoil revenue on recurrent expenditure is considered, it is found that a 
positive change in nonoil revenue has a negative and significant effect in the short-run. The 
effect is, however, turned positive in the long-run in which a change in positive nonoil revenue 
by 1% spurs the recurrent expenditure by 0.57% in the long-run. However, when nonoil revenue 
dwindles, it has a negative effect on the recurrent expenditure in both runs. More explicitly, 
when nonoil revenue declines by 1%, recurrent expenditure also declines by 1.46% and 1.40% in 
the short-run and the long-run respectively. Finally, a positive change in nonoil revenue only has 
a significant positive effect on the capital expenditure in the long-run while its reduction leads to 
a falling capital expenditure in both runs. Concisely, it is found that a 1% positive change in 
nonoil revenue gingers capital expenditure by 2.31% in the long-run. Contrariwise, a reduction in 
nonoil revenue by 1% results in capital expenditure dwindled by 2.98% and 2.57% in the short-
run and long-run respectively. 
 Finally, the results of diagnostic tests are also presented in Table 5. The diagnostic tests 
performed include normality test, serial correlation test, arch LM test, Ramsey Reset test and 
CUSUM and CUSUM square test. The results yield mixed findings. However, in general term, 
none of the models suffers from serial correction and heteroskedasticity problems as shown by 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM and ARCH LM tests respectively. Most of the models 
are normally distributed and well specified as depicted by Jacque-Bera and Ramsey Reset test 
results respectively. CUSUM and CUSUM square tests also produce mixed results.   
Table 5: NARDL Cointegration Results 
 Total Revenues Oil Revenues Nonoil Revenues 
Variable Total Exp.  
(3 lags) 
Cap. Exp. 
(2 lags) 
Total Exp.  
(3 lags) 
Cap. Exp.    (3 
lags) 
Total Exp. 
(3 lags) 
Recur. Exp. 
(1 lag) 
Cap. Exp. 
(4 lags) 
 
 Short-run Results  
D(TROEXP_GDP(-1)) 
 
 0.24*** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.26*** 
(0.0000) 
  
D(TROEXP_GDP(-2)) 
 
 
  
0.11** 
(0.0100) 
  
D(RCAPEXP_GDP(-1)) 
 
-0.24** 
(0.0139) 
    
0.17*** 
(0.0001) 
D(TRREV_GDP_POS) -0.07  
(0.7350) 
0.18 
(0.5336) 
     
D(TRREV_GDP_POS(-1) 3.12*** 
(0.0000) 
0.79*** 
(0.0044) 
     
D(TRREV_GDP_POS(-2)) -1.84*** 
(0.0000) 
      
D(TRREV_GDP_NEG) 0.50*** 
(0.0000) 
0.31*** 
(0.0003) 
     
D(TRREV_GDP_NEG(-1)) -0.25*** 
(0.0000) 
      
D(ROILREV_GDP_POS) 
  
-0.16 
(0.2081) 
0.35*** 
(0.0004) 
   
D(ROILREV_GDP_POS(-1) 
  
2.11*** 
(0.0000) 
    
D(ROILREV_GDP_POS(-2)) 
  
-1.60*** 
(0.0000) 
    
D(ROILREV_GDP_NEG 
  
0.68*** 
(0.0000) 
0.57*** 
(0.0000) 
   
D(ROILREV_GDP_NEG(-1)) 
 
 
-0.57*** 
(0.0000) 
    
D(ROILREV_GDP_NEG(-2))
 
  
0.09*** 
(0.0365) 
    
D(RNONOILREV_GDP_POS 
    
0.38 
(0.4014) 
-1.26** 
(0.0152) 
0.31 
(0.2784) 
D(RNONOILREV_GDP_POS(-1) 
    
-2.99*** 
(0.0000) 
 
-3.20*** 
(0.0000) 
D(RNONOILREV_GDP_POS(-2) 
    
3.17*** 
(0.0000) 
 
2.98***  
(0.0000) 
D(RNONOILREV_GDP_NEG) 
    
5.19*** 
(0.0000) 
1.46*** 
(0.0000) 
3.15*** 
(0.0000) 
D(RNONOILREV_GDP_NEG(-1)) 
    
-0.12 
(0.3009) 
 
-0.22*** 
(0.0002) 
D(RNONOILREV_GDP_NEG(-2)) 
    
-0.58*** 
(0.0000) 
  
        
1tECM   -0.71*** (0.0000) 
-0.74*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.88*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.69*** 
(0.0000) 
-1.15*** 
(0.0000) 
-1.05*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.96 
(0.0000) 
 Long-run Results  
tancons t  0.66*** 
(0.0000) 
0.44*** 
(0.0000) 
0.44*** 
(0.0000) 
-1.68*** 
(0.0000) 
2.02*** 
(0.0000) 
0.85*** 
(0.0000) 
1.28***  
(0.0000) 
TRREV_GDP_POS 0.43*** 
(0.0019) 
-0.09 
(0.5899) 
     
TRREV_GDP_NEG 0.68*** 
(0.0000) 
0.25*** 
(0.0002) 
     
ROILREV_GDP_POS 
  
0.87*** 
(0.0000) 
0.51*** 
(0.0004) 
   
ROILREV_GDP_NEG 
  
1.14*** 
(0.0000) 
0.83*** 
(0.0000) 
 
  
RNONOILREV_GDP_POS 
    
3.67*** 
(0.0000) 
0.57*** 
(0.0038) 
2.31*** 
(0.0000) 
RNONOILREV_GDP_NEG 
    
4.06*** 
(0.0000) 
1.40*** 
(0.0000) 
2.57*** 
(0.0000) 
WALD SR  64.90*** (0.0000) 60.29*** (0.0000) 71.16*** (0.0000) 86.18*** (0.0000) 94.05*** (0.0000) 76.12*** (0.0000) 105.11*** (0.0000) 
WALD LR  22.79*** 
(0.0000) 
23.07*** 
(0.0000) 
49.09*** 
(0.0000) 
43.83*** 
(0.0000) 
38.15*** 
(0.0000) 
53.23*** 
(0.0000) 
29.36*** 
(0.0000) 
Bound-Testing F-Test 22.08*** 6.86*** 18.33*** 4.65* 210.56*** 10.02*** 225.65*** 
 Diagnostic Results  
2R  0.9851 (98.51%) 
0.9193 
(91.93%) 
0.9926 
(99.26%) 
0.9401 
(94.10%) 
0.9963 
(99.63%) 
0.9885 
(98.85%) 
0.9928 
(99.28%) 
2AdjR  0.9810 (98.10%) 0.9011 (90.11%) 0.9898 (98.98%) 
0.9352 
(93.52%) 
0.9947 
(99.47%) 
0.9872 
(98.72%) 
0.9904 
(99.04%) 
F stat  240.12 (0.0000) 50.45 (0.0000) 360.71 (0.0000) 193.53 (0.0000) 629.75 (0.0000) 755.27 (0.0000) 427.03 (0.0000) 
DW  2.32 1.54 2.51 1.96 1.81 1.95 2.02 
NMT
 
1.27 
(0.5287) 
1.27 
(0.5295) 
8.29 
(0.0158) 
1.14 
(0.5655) 
5.90 
(0.0522) 
6.69 
(0.0352) 
0.63 
(0.7281) 
SCT  1.16 
(0.3271) 
2.81 
(0.0768) 
2.44 
(0.1076) 
0.46 
(0.6364) 
0.55 
(0.5831) 
1.25 
(0.2992) 
0.04 
(0.9589) 
LMT  0.64 
(0.4279) 
2.46 
(0.0512) 
0.23 
(0.6369) 
3.55 
(0.0672) 
0.73 
(0.3971) 
1.07 
(0.3084) 
0.74 
(0.3947) 
RRT  2.38 
(0.1338) 
1.39 
(0.2470) 
0.70 
(0.4094) 
0.72 
(0.4021) 
44.87 
(0.0000) 
1.07 
(0.3062) 
64.87 
(0.0000) 
( 2)CS CS  NS (S) NS (S) NS (S) S(S) S(S) NS (S) S(S) 
Source: Authors’ computation 
***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively 
CS and CS2 represent CUSUM and CUSUM square respectively  
 
4 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This study examines the asymmetric relationship between government revenues and 
expenditures over the period of 1970-2011. By applying nonlinear causality and cointegration in 
the spirit of Diks and Panchenko, (2006) and Shin, et al (2014) respectively, it is found that 
revenue-spending hypothesis prevailed over fiscal synchronisation hypothesis when the 
nonlinear causality approach is applied on aggregated and disaggregated data. The finding is 
corroborated by cointegration technique based on a NARDL approach to cointegration. In fact, 
decomposing the revenues into positive and negative components and examining their impacts 
on the expenditures reveal that positive revenues have positive impacts on the expenditures and 
as expected, negative revenues have negative effects on the expenditures. These findings show 
the asymmetric nexus between government revenues and expenditures in Nigeria whether the 
aggregated or disaggregated data are considered. The findings further confirm the dependence of 
government on the revenues it is able to realise to finance its expenditures on social-economic 
facilities. A cursory observation of the trend of revenue and expenditure data over time depicts 
this asymmetric behaviour between the two variables. When government revenues decline, 
government expenditures also decline in Nigeria and vice versa. This situation occurs because 
about 90% of government revenues come from the sales of crude oil in the international market.8 
When the oil prices nosedive due to whatever reasons, government expenditures also decline. 
This ultimately constrains the government in terms of its financing capacity because the 
government budget formation and implementation rest almost on the availability of revenues 
from the sales of crude oil (Raifu and Raheem, 2018). The over-reliance on oil revenues has been 
the bane of economic growth and development over the years in Nigeria. Thus, diversification of 
the economy to other neglected sectors of the economy that can generate more revenues to 
government appears to be a panacea to the precarious economic conditions that the country is 
usually subjected to whenever there is oil price crisis in the international market. Besides, oil 
revenues should be judiciously utilised during the oil price booms when oil revenues pour-in like 
the rain as it is usually done in some oil-producing countries such as Norway, United Arab 
Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar to mention but a few. 
                                                          
8
 Even though non-oil revenues contribute meagerly to the overall total revenues in Nigeria, this does not, however, 
connote that non-oil revenues are not important to the Nigerian economy. Whenever oil revenues suffer devastating 
blow due to a decline in oil prices in the international market, non-oil revenues play a supportive or cushioning role 
in the economy, attenuating the negative effect of oil revenue shortage on the economy.    
A Table of Summary of Literature Review 
S/N Author Topic Scope Method Finding 
1 Zapf and Paynes, 2009 Asymmetric modelling of the revenue-expenditure 
nexus: evidence from aggregate state and local 
government in the US 1959 to 2005 
US aggregate state and local 
government data 
TAR and MTAR cointegration 
methods 
No asymmetric relationship between revenues and spending. However, 
asymmetric error correction method support spending-tax revenue hypothesis 
2 Westerlund, Mahdavi and Firoozi, 
2011 
The tax-spending nexus: Evidence from a panel of US 
state–local governments 
Panel of 50 US State-local 
government.  
1963-1997 
Panel error correction model Support tax-spending hypothesis meaning that the size of state and local 
governments are driven by resources not expenditure demand 
3 Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen, 
1989 
The revenues-expenditures nexus: Evidence from 
local government data 
171 municipal governments. 
1972-1980 
VAR Revenue-tax hypothesis 
4 Tiwari and Mutascu, 2016 The revenues-spending nexus in Romania: a TAR and 
MTAR approach 
Romania  
1999:1-2012:1 
TAR and MTAR Spending-Tax hypothesis with long-run cointegration adjustment 
5 Garcia, 2012 The Revenues-Expenditures Nexus: a Panel Data 
Analysis of Spain's Regions (Running title: Tax -
Expenditure, Expenditure-tax or Fiscal 
Synchronization) 
Spain’s Regions 
1987-2003 
VAR Revenue-spending hypothesis  
6 Aregbeyen and Ibrahim, 2012 Testing the Revenue and Expenditure Nexus in 
Nigeria: An Application of the Bound Test Approach 
Nigeria 1970-2008 ARDL Tax-Spending Hypothesis  
7 Fasano and Wang, 2002 Testing the Relationship Between Government 
Spending and Revenue: Evidence from GCC 
Countries 
Oil Producing GCC Countries 
1975-2000 
Cointegration and error 
correction model 
Revenue-spending hypothesis  
8 Saunoris and Payne, 2010 Tax more or spend less? Asymmetries in the UK 
revenue–expenditure nexus 
UK, 1955-2009 MTAR Spending-Tax Hypothesis 
9 Owoye, 1995 The causal relationship between taxes and 
expenditures in the G7 countries: cointegration and 
error-correction models 
G7 Countries  
1961-1990 
Cointegration and ECM  Fiscal synchronisation hypothesis except Japan and Italy (Tax-Spending 
Hypothesis) 
10 Mutascu, 2017 The tax–spending nexus: evidence from Romania 
using wavelet analysis 
Romania 
1991:M1-2015:M5 
Wavelet approach Individual taxes methods under reforms should be employed to counter budget 
deficit in the short-run  
11 Mutascu, 2016 Government revenues and expenditures in the East 
European economies: A bootstrap panel granger 
causality approach 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Slovania, Estomia, 
Slovak Republic, Lativa, 
Lithuania, Poland and Romania 
1995-2012 
bootstrap panel granger causality Bulgaria: expenditure-spending hypothesis 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovania: Spending-Revenue Hypothesis, Slovak 
Republic: Fiscal synchronization hypothesis. 
Lativa, Lithuania, Poland and Romania:  Institutional Hypothesis  
12 Phiri, 2016 Asymmetries in the revenue–expenditure nexus: new 
evidence from South Africa 
South Africa 
1960:1-2016:2 
MTAR-TEC Fiscal synchronisation hypothesis 
Long-run elasticity between revenue and expenditure is less than1 
13 Li, 2001  Government revenue, government expenditure, and 
temporal causality: evidence from China 
China 
1950-1997 
VECM and VAR Fiscal Synchronisation Hypothesis  
14 Joulfaian and Mookerjee, 1991 Dynamics of government revenues and expenditures 
in industrial economies 
22 Industrial economies  (OECD 
Countries) 1961-1986  
VAR  Spending reduction is important to reducing budget deficits and controlling 
government size  
15 Gounder, Narayan and Prasad, 2007 An empirical investigation of the relationship between 
government revenue and expenditure: The case of the 
Fiji Islands 
Fiji Island Granger Causality and Johansen 
Cointegration 
Short-run cointegration exist between revenue and expenditure 
At aggregate level: expenditure-revenue hypothesis 
At disaggregate level:  fiscal synchronisation hypothesis  
16 Dahlberg and Johansson,1998 The revenues-expenditures nexus: panel data 
evidence from Swedish municipalities 
256 Swedish municipalities 
1974-87 
PVAR Expenditure-Revenue Hypothesis  
17 Mohanty and Mishra, 2017 Cointegration between government expenditure and 
revenue: Evidence from India  
India 
1980-81-2013-14 
Jonansen cointegration method Revenue-Expenditure hypothesis  
18 Al-Zeaud, 2014 The Causal Relationship between Government 
Revenue and Expenditure in Jordan 
Jordan 
1990-2011 
Granger causality and VECM 
test  
Fiscal synchronisation hypothesis  
19 Chang and Chiang, 2009 Revisiting the government revenue-expenditure 
nexus: Evidence from 15 OECD countries based on 
the panel data approach 
15 OECD Countries 
1996-2006 
Panel Cointegration and 
Causality 
Fiscal-Policy synchronisation  
20 Ibrahim, 2017 Government expenditure-revenue nexus reconsidered 
for Nigeria: Does structural break matter 
Nigeria 
1970-2015 
Lee and Strazicich (2003 & 
2004) unit root test;  
Toda-Yamamoto modified Wald 
causality test  
Causality method without structural break: Fiscal synchronization hypothesis  
Causality method with structural break: spending-revenue hypothesis  
21 Narayan and Narayan  2006 Government revenue and government expenditure 
nexus: evidence from developing countries 
12 developing countries  
Vary based on each country 
Toda-Yamamoto Causality test Tax-and-spend hypothesis: Mauritius, El Salvador, Haiti, Chile and Venezuela.  
Spend-Tax hypothesis: Haiti 
No causality: Peru, South Africa, Guatemala, Uruguay and Ecuador  
22 Narayan,  2005 The government revenue and government expenditure 
nexus: empirical evidence from nine Asian countries 
Asian Countries  
Vary based on each country 
ARDL and VECM Cointegration exists in three out of nine countries considered.  
Indonesia, Singapore, Sri Lanka: Tax-spending hypothesis for short-run 
Nepal: Tax-spending hypothesis both short-run and long-run 
Indonesia and Sri Lanka: spending-tax hypothesis in the long-run 
India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines and Thailand:  Neutrality (Insitution 
Separation Hypothesis 
23 Abdulrasheed, B., 2017 Causality between government expenditure and 
government revenue in Nigeria 
Nigeria 
1986-2015 
ECM Spending-Revenue hypothesis  
24 Mehrara, Pahlavani and  Elyasi, 
2011 
Government revenue and government expenditure 
nexus in Asian countries: Panel cointegration and 
causality 
40 Asian Countries 
1995-2008 
Kao Panel Cointegration Cointegration exist between revenue and expenditure 
Fiscal synchronization hypothesis 
25 Yinusa and Adedokun, 2017  Fiscal Synchronisation or Institutional Separation: An 
Examination of Tax-Spend Hypothesis in Nigeria 
Nigeria 
1980-2014 
Granger-Causality 
Block exogeneity VECM 
Tax-Spending hypothesis  
26 Obeng,  2015 A Causality Test of the Revenue-Expenditure Nexus in 
Ghana 
Ghana  
1980-2013 
OLS, VAR and Granger-
causality test 
Revenue-expenditure hypothesis 
27 Takumah, 2 014 The Dynamic Causal Relationship between 
Government Revenue and Government Expenditure 
Nexus in Ghana 
Ghana 
1986-2012 
ARDL  Cointegrated 
Fiscal synchronization hypothesis 
 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
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